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Abstract
This paper considers a two period labor contract. In the first
period the worker-firm attachment is made. In the second period the
firm's value product is subject to a random shock and the worker
obtains a random draw from a distribution over opportunity wages. The
firm shock is assumed to be observable by both the firm and its
workers. The worker's second period opportunity wage is taken to be
privately held information. In this framework the form of the optimal
contract written in the first period is analyzed.
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Optimal Long Term Labor Contracts When Workers
Have Heterogenous Opportunities
by Lanny Arvan
I. Introduction
Much of the recent literature on implicit contracts has stressed
the importance of the secondary spot market for labor services in
determining the form of the optimal labor contract. The initial
papers on implicit contracts by Azariadas (1975), Baily (1974), and
Gordon (1974) were all based on the assumption of immobile labor, at
the time when the firm specific shock is realized. On the other
extreme, these same papers assumed perfect labor mobility, prior to
the attachment of workers to their eventual employers. Akerlof and
Miyazaki (1980) argue that distinguishing ex ante and ex post labor
mobility in this manner is artificial. Holmstrom (1983), in a multi-
period model with perfectly mobile labor in each period, demonstrates
that long term implicit contracts can still dominate shorter term
arrangements. In spite of opportunities for workers elsewhere, a firm
can effectively bind workers to the firm by "front end loading" the
insurance premiums embodied in the implicit contract. That is, by
lowering wage payments during early (and less risky) periods of
employment for the promise of higher as well as less variable wages
during later (and more risky) periods of employment, the firm provides
incentives for workers to remain with the firm. However, the
secondary spot market still provides viable alternatives for worker
employment. As a result, Holmstrom concludes that contract wages are
downward rigid, i.e., they are bounded below by the wage paid on the
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secondary spot market. This downward rigidity in the wage solves the
problem of worker quits.
This paper attempts to extend Holmstrom's analysis by recognizing
that the secondary spot market is in fact a collection of markets
where a variety of different labor services are traded. Workers who
are homogenous with regard to their productivity at their current
place of employment may nevertheless command different wages on the
secondary spot market because their productivity at alternate places
of employment need not be the same. These differences need to be
taken into account in optimal contract design. In particular,
employment, wages, and severance pay should all be made contingent
on the worker's opportunities in the secondary spot market.
Most of the papers that have incorporated some degree of ex post
labor mobility with worker heterogeneity, in regard to opportunities
external to the firm, have focused on the role of search in deter-
mining the form of the implicit contract. When search is costly, it
is clear that implicit contracts will not provide for perfect income
insurance, since such insurance mitigates the incentives to search.
This is a welcome result since, in reality, such perfect insurance is
not present. For that reason, the papers of Azariadas, Baily, Gordon,
and Holmstrom all assume zero severance payments to laid off workers.
But within the internal logic of these models, such an assumption is
arbitrary since moral hazard associated with search is not present.
When workers face different costs of search, it is efficient for
only some workers to search, i.e. , those with low search costs.
Hence, when a firm lays off some of its workers, it should not do so
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indiscriminantly. But it is reasonable to assume that firms cannot
observe worker search costs. Consequently an optimal implicit
contract must provide the correct incentives to induce only low search
cost workers to search. The provision of such incentives reduces the
ability of the implicit contract to provide income insurance and also
has a negative impact on allocative efficiency. This is the theme of
the paper by Geanakoplos and Ito (1984), which focuses on the use of
recalls as a device to reveal search costs, and the paper by Arnott,
Hosios, and Stiglitz (1983), which focuses on the issue of work
sharing versus lay off as an information revealing device.
This paper abstracts from concerns over work sharing and also
ignores problems associated with moral hazard related to search.
Attention is fixed exclusively on the adverse selection problems which
occur in the design of the optimal contract, when workers have dif-
ferent opportunities on the ex post spot market. Kahn (1985) also
analyzes the optimal contract design when adverse selection is a
problem. Kahn's formulation is similar to the one in this paper,
but Kahn views the contract as a deterministic function of worker
opportunities. The analysis in this paper provides for the possibi-
lity of a much larger spectrum of information revealing devices than
have been previously considered, because the contract is viewed as a
random function of worker opportunities, i.e., each worker obtains a
lottery over employment and layoff with a wage payment associated
with the employment outcome and a severance payment associated with
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the layoff outcome. These lotteries are then made contingent on the
workers' opportunities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
sets up the model. Section III provides a solution to the model under
the assumption of perfect information ex post. Sections IV, V, and VI
analyze the model when the firm remains uninformed about its workers'
opportunities ex post. Section VII offers a brief conclusion.
II. Set-up of the Model
To reduce matters to their barest essentials, the model is assumed
to last two periods. In the first period each worker forms a
contractual attachment with a particular firm. The contract specifies
a wage rate in the first period, the probability of being employed in
the second period, the wage rate in the second period in the event
that the worker is employed, and the severance payment in the second
period in the event that the worker is laid off. The latter three
parameters are contingent on the firm's second period value product
and the worker's second period opportunity wage. This opportunity
wage is the price the worker could obtain for his labor services on
the second period spot market. The crux of this paper is that workers
are heterogenous with regard to their opportunity wages. Further, a
particular worker's opportunity wage is privately held information
which cannot be observed by the firm.
In the first period, the worker's second period opportunity wage
and the firm's second period value product are random variables. Tra-
ditional theory suggests that the worker's second period remuneration
will be random as well. The worker is assumed to be unable to hedge
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against this income risk, and is therefore taken to be risk averse.
The firm is assumed to be risk neutral. Consequently, the long term
contract serves, in part, as an insurance contract where workers are
guarded against fluctuations in their second period income. In pro-
viding this income insurance the firm has several advantages over
potential third party insurers. For instance, the firm can more
accurately assess the ex ante income risks involved since these risks
are determined to a great extent by the terras of the contract.
Nevertheless, the firm will not be perfectly informed. As a result of
adverse selection problems, the optimal contract does not involve per-
fect insurance.
There are two types of adverse selection problems discussed in the
paper. First, in states where the firm finds it advantageous to lay
off some of its workers, i.e., these workers have opportunity wages in
excess of their value product at the firm, the severance payment to
laid off workers should vary inversely with their opportunity wage.
This is in keeping with insuring workers against income risk. In this
case, high opportunity wage workers have incentive to misrepresent
their opportunity wage in order to secure a higher severance payment.
This type of adverse selection is termed layoff adverse selection.
2Second, it is assumed that workers are free to quit the firm. Hence,
it is necessary that the second period wage payment be at least as
large as the worker's opportunity wage, if the firm is to retain the
worker. In states where the firm wishes to retain its workers, it may
offer higher wages to workers with higher opportunity wages, in order
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to secure their employment. In this case low opportunity wage workers
have incentive to misrepresent their opportunity wage in order to be
paid more by their present employer. This type of adverse selection
is termed quit adverse selection.
The optimal contract deals with layoff adverse selection by
punishing workers for lying about their opportunity wage. In this
case the probability of employment varies directly with the severance
payment and inversely with the worker's opportunity wage. A high
opportunity wage worker who attempts to get a high severance payment
finds that his chances of being retained are greater. Since his
income when he is retained is less than it would be were he separated
from the firm, this worker is discouraged from misrepresenting his
opportunity wage. The solution to quit adverse selection is similar.
A low opportunity wage worker who attempts to get a higher wage finds
that his chances of being retained are less. This, too, discourages
misrepresentation of the opportunity wage.
For simplicity assume that labor is the firm's only input in pro-
duction and that the firm operates under stochastic, constant returns
to scale. Let k~ denote the firm's certain (marginal=average) value
product in the first period, and k denote the firm's random value
product in the second period.
All workers are assumed to be homogenous initially. Each worker
is endowed with an indivisible unit of labor service. Hence a worker
is employed by at most one firm in any period. In the second period
each worker possesses human capital specific to his first period
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employer. All workers employed by a particular firm in the first
period are assumed to possess the same average value product, k, with
that firm in the second period.
In the second period the firm's input consists of workers retained
from the first period and/or workers hired on the second period spot
market. Workers on the spot market have either been laid off by
3
their previous employer or have quit their previous job. Such
workers are assumed to be heterogenous in regard to the complementary
attribute-skill vector that they bring to their new job. For
simplicity assume that each firm requires workers with a particular
attribute-skll vector. Though the workers on the spot market who
fulfill these attribute-skill requirements are different from the
retained workers who possess firm specific human capital, it is con-
venient to assume that these workers are perfect substitutes as inputs
in second period production. Hence, it is assumed that the average
value product of any worker hired on the spot market is otk, where a is
a positive scalar. (a may be a random variable.) Since the second
period spot market is assumed to be competitive and production is
assumed to occur under constant returns to scale, the wage rate for
workers with this particular attribute skill vector must be at least
ak. Because workers hired on the second period spot market do not
alter the firm's profits, it is convenient to ignore them in the
firm's decision problem.
At the start of the second period each worker obtains a random
draw from a distribution over attribute-skill vectors. Since the
-8-
attribute-skill requirements of firms are assumed to differ and the
value products of firms differ as well, workers with different
attribute-skill vectors will have different opportunity wages. The
opportunity wage of a given worker is the maximum average value pro-
duct among those firms which require the attribute-skill vector that
the given worker possesses. Since the focus of this paper is the
optimal labor contract of a particular firm, it is simply assumed that
each worker obtains a random draw from a distribution over opportunity
wages. Let w denote the opportunity wage of a representative worker.
Let F denote the joint distribution function over workers' opportunity
wages and the firm's average value product.
A long-term labor contract between the firm and a given worker is
a first period wage, w_ , and a function, (e,w,s), where e(w ,k) is the
probability of being retained in the second period, w(w ,k) is the
wage payment if retained, and s(w ,k) is the severance payment if
laid off, when w is the worker's opportunity wage and k is the
firm's average value product. For a long terra contract to attract the
worker initially, it must grant expected utility at least as large as
the expected utility the worker can obtain elsewhere. Let u be the
2
worker's one period utility function. It is assumed that u e C , u' > 0,
and u" < 0. Let V be the parametrically given, two period expected
utility level that the worker can obtain elsewhere. Then the expected
utility constraint on the long terra contract is given by
(1) u(w
Q )
+ /[e(w+ ,k)u(w(w+ ,k)) + (l-e(w+ ,k))u(w++s(w+ ,k))JdF(w
+
,k) > V.
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Since workers are free to quit, it is also required that a feasible
contract satisfy
(2) w(w ,k)
_> w for all w ,k.
Since workers separated from their original employer are under no
obligation to that employer, it is required that
(3) s(w
+
ik) 2 for all w+ ,k.
Since e(w ,k) is the probability of being retained, it is required
that
(4) < e(w+ ,k) j< 1 for all w
+
,k.
It is assumed that k is observable by both the firm and the
workers it hired in the first period. If w is also symmetrically
observed, then the problem for the firm maximizing expected profit
can be written as
(5) maximize kQ
- w
Q
+ / [e(w
+
,k) [k-w(w+ ,k)J - (l-e(w+ ,k) )s(w+ ,k) ]dF(w+ ,k)
subject to (1), (2), (3), and (4).
Note : The above problem is written as if the firm hires only one
worker in the first period. Since each worker possesses the same util-
ity function, is risk averse, and faces the same period one probability
distribution over the opportunity wages in the second period, it is
optimal for the firm to offer all workers the same contract in the
first period. Furthermore, the firm must make zero expected profits
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since it operates under stochastic, constant returns to scale. In
equilibrium, the parameter V adjusts so that this condition is
satisfied. Hence the scale of the firm is indeterminante.
In order to understand the problem when the firm does not observe
w
,
the model is first solved under the assumption that workers and
the firm have symmetric information. The solution to (5) is charac-
terized in the next section.
III. Symmetric Information
The problem given in (5) Is solved in two stages. First, the
second period problem is solved conditional on the firm's average
value product being k and assuming that the firm has promised the
worker expected utility equal to U(k) in this event. Then the optimal
U(k) is found. The second period problem is given by
(6) maximize / [e(w
+
) [k-w(w
+
) ] - (l-e(w
+))s(w+)]dF(w+ |k)
subject to /[e(w+)u(w(w+)) + (l-e(w+))u(w++s(w+ )) ]dF(w+ |k) > U(k),
w(w+ ) 2 w+ , s(w+ ) 2 0> and < e(w
+
) _< 1.
Note : The explicit dependence of contract variables on k has been
dropped to enhance readability.
Assume that F is continuously dif ferentiable and let the con-
ditional density be denoted by f(w |k). Let the support of this den-
sity be the interval [w,wj. Define the state variable U(w ) by
+
.
w
-
(7) U(w ) = / (e(w)u(w(w)) + (l-e(w))u(w+s(w))]f(wjk)dw.
w
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Letting the control variables be e(w ), w(w ), and s(w ), the
Hamiltonian for the problem is
(8) H = {e(w+)[k-w(w+ ) + Xu(w(w+))J + (l-e(w
+
)) [-s(w
+
) + Xu(w++s(w+)) J} f (w
+ |k)
Since the Hamiltonian does not depend on the state variable, the
costate variable, X , is a constant. The remaining necessary con-
ditions are
(9) e(w
+
) =0 if k-w(w+ ) + Xu(w(w+ )) < -s(w+ ) + Xu(w++s(w+ ))
,
e(w ) = 1 if k-w(w ) + Xu(w(w )) > -s(w ) + Xu(w +s(w )),
and <^ e(w+ ) _< 1.
(10) e(w
+
)(-l + Xu'(w(w+))] _< 0, w(w
+
) 2 w+ > and
(w(w+)-w+)e(w+)[-l + Xu'(w(w+))J = 0.
(11) (l-e(w
+))[-l + Xu , (w
+
+s(w+))J < 0, s(w
+
) > 0, and
s(w+)(l-e(w+))[-l + Xu'(w+ + s(w++s(w
+
))] = 0.
(12) U(w) 2"U(k).
Theorem 1 : The solution to (6) takes the following form
(13) e(w+ ) = 1 for w+ < k,
e(w ) = for w > k.
(14) w(w ) = max(w ,w ) when e(w ) > 0.
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(15) s(w ) = max(w -w ,0) when e(w ) < 1.
w
Proof : The constraint (12) is binding as long as U(k) > J u(w )f(w jk)dw ,
_w
When this inequality holds X > 0. Assuming this, let w be implicitly
defined by u'(w ) = —. Let G = k - w + Xu(w). G is strictly concave
C A
in w. It follows that argmax G = max(w ,w ). Let L = -s + Xu(w +s).
w > w+
c
L is strictly concave in s. It follows that argmax L = max(w -w ,0).
> > +
S
^
°
Furthermore, max G = max L as k ^ w . Since the controls are chosen
w
_> w
+ s> <
to maximize the Hamiltonian, H, the theorem follows directly from the
above.
Theorem 1 says that the optimal contract satisfies a productive
efficiency condition, (13), and an insurance condition, (14) and (15).
That is, workers are retained by the firm if their marginal value
product is greater than their opportunity wage and workers are laid
off if their marginal value product is less than their opportunity
wage. Furthermore, a worker's income is independent of his oppor-
tunity wage as long as the opportunity wage is below a certain level.
Note that there is a downward jump discontinuity in the optimal
control, e(w ) , at w = k.
We proceed to a determination of the optimal U(k). Let Ti(k,U(k))
be the value of the objective in (6) when evaluated along the optimal
program. The optimal contract problem given in (5) can be rewritten
as
-13-
(16) maximize k -w + / ir(k,U(k))f„(k)dk
k_
subject to u(w
Q )
+ / U(k)fK(k)dk2 V,
k
where fv(k) is the marginal density of k and [_k,k] is the support of
this density. This problem can be viewed as a control problem with
control U(k) and state variable X(k), where
k_
(17) X(k) = / U(h)f„(h)dh.
k
K
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
(18) H = U(k,U(k)) + u U(k)]fK(k)
The control U(k) is constrained by
w
(19) U(k) > / U(w
+)f(w+ |k)dw+ .
w
Since the state variable X(k) does not enter into the Hamiltonian, the
costate variable u is a constant. The remaining necessary condition
is.
(20) Tr-g(k,U(k)) + y _<
with equality when (19) holds as a strict inequality.
As long as (19) is satisfied, Trjj(k,"u(k)) = -X(k), where A(k) is
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the costate variable of the Hamiltonian given by (8). Furthermore,
w
when U - / u(w
+
)f (w
+ |k)dw+
,
ir-^kjf) + u > as long as u'(w(k)) > -.
w M
Finally, the optimal first period wage, w„ , satisfies
(21) o'(w )-i.
This condition, along with Theorem 1, implies the following result.
Theorem 2 ; The solution to (5) takes the following form.
(21) e(w+ ,k) = 1 for w+ < k,
e(w ,k) = for w > k.
(22) w(w ,k) = max(w ,w ) when e(w ,k) > 0.
(23) s(w ,k) = max(w
n
~w ,0) when e(w ,k) < 1.
IV. Privately Observed Opportunity Wages
When w is not observed by the firm the contract specified in the
previous section may not be feasible. From the literature on incen-
tive compatibility, an optimal contract can be found by imposing the
self-selection constraints
(24) e(w+ ) u(w(w
+
)) + (l-e(w
+))u(w++s(w+ )) >_
e(w)u(w(w)) + (l-e(w))u(w +s(w)) for all w ,w e [w,w],
•
Viewing the right hand side of (24) as a function of w, the above
constraints require that this function is maximized on [w,w] at w .
The first order necessary condition for such a maximum is given by
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(25) e(w+)[u(w(w+))-u(w++s(w+))]+w(w+)e(w+)u'(w(w+))+s(w+)(l-e(w+))u'(w++s(w+))=
where a dot above a variable indicates a derivative with respect to w .
For (24) to hold, (25) must hold for all w e[w,w]. Since it is more
natural to consider e, w, and s as controls (25) will not be imposed
directly. Instead a new state variable, Y(w ), is introduced, where
+ + + +
Y(w ) = (l-e(w ))u'(w +s(w )). Then the following state-control
constraint is imposed.
(25') Y(w+ ) = e(w+)u(w(w+)) + (l-e(w+))u(w++s(w+))
.
Differentiation of (25') with respect to w yields (25) after a
substitution for Y(w ). In what follows, the problem specified in (6)
is analyzed when (25 1 ) is treated as an additional constraint.
Before proceeding further, it is appropriate at this juncture to
discuss sufficiency. That is, under what conditions does a contract
which satisfies (25) also satisfy (24)? A natural sufficiency con-
dition is to require that the right hand side of (24) be pseudo-
concave in w (single-peaked) with peak at w . Formally, this
condition is given by
(26) e(w)[u(w(w))-u(w++s(w))] + w(w)e(w)u' (w(w)) + s( w)( l-e(w))u' (
w
+
+s( w)
)
-t as w — w.
Since (25) must hold at w, (26) is equivalent to
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(26*) e(w)[u(wfs(w)) - u(w++s(w))]
+ &(w)(l-e(w))[u'(w++s(w))-u'(w+s(w))J j as w+ ^ w.
Note that (26') is satisfied if e(w), s(w) j< for all w e [w,w]
.
Contracts which satisfy this latter property will be called montonic
contracts. The results which follow provide sufficient conditions
under which the optimal contract is a monotonic contract.
The firm's second period problem when it cannot observe the
worker's opportunity wage can be written as
w
(27) maximize / {ke-[we+s(l-e) J} f (w |k)dw
< e < 1 w
w 2 w + , s 2
subject to
U = Yf(w
+ |k), U(w) = 0, U(w) = U(k)
Y = (l-e)u'(w
+
+s), Y = eu(w) + (l-e)u(w
+
+s) , Y(w) > u(w)
Note : In the above the explicit dependence of controls and state
variables on w has been dropped.
The Hamiltonian for this problem is
(28) H = {ke-[we+s(l-e)]}f(w+ |lc) + X Yf(w
+ |k) + X (l-e)u' (w++s)
Since (25') must be satisfied the associated Lagrangian is
(29) L = H + uleu(w)+(l-e)u(w++s) - Y]
.
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Since the state variable U does not enter in L, the costate
variable, X , is a constant. The costate equation for X is given by
(30) -X = X
u
f(w+ |k) - u .
The remaining necessary conditions are
(31) e = if [k-w+s]f(w
+ |k) - X u'(w++s) + y [u( w)-u(w
+
+s) ] <
e = 1 if [k-w+s]f(w
+ |k) - X u*(u++s) + y [u(w)-u(w
+
+s) ] >
and 0< e< 1.
(32) e[-f(w
+ |k) + yu'(w)]
_< 0, w > w
+
and
(w-w+)e[-f(w+ |k) +pu'(w)] = 0.
(33) (l-e)[-f(w
+ |k) + X u"(w++s) + yu'(w++s)] < 0, s 2 0, and
s(l-e)[-f(w+ |k) + X u"(w++s) + uu'(w
+
+s)J = 0.
There is also a transversality condition.
(34) \ (w) = 0, Y(w) > u(w), X (w)[Y(w)-u(w)J = 0.
The form of the solution depends on the relationship between the
parameters w, w, k, and u (U(k)). Attention will be restricted to
the case w < k so that the firm will find it efficient to always
retain some of its workers.
If the solution to the symmetric information case happens to
satisfy (24) , then naturally this continues to be the solution when
w is privately observed. When w < k and w < u~ (U(k)) a full
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employment, constant wage contract is optimal. When w > k let
k w
/ u(k)f(w
+ |k)dw+ + / u(w+)f(w+ |k)dw+ = UBE . When U(k) = \PE , the
w k
optimal contract is one which fully employs all workers whose oppor-
tunity wage is less than k at a wage equal to k and lays off without
severance pay all workers with a higher opportunity wage.
In what follows it will be convenient to distinguish two cases.
Though it is common to call firm induced separations layoffs and
worker induced separations quits, these terms will take on a slightly
different meaning in this paper. The optimal contract will be charac-
— BE
terized by layoffs if U(k) > U . The optimal contract will be
BE _i
characterized by quits if U(k) < U or if u (U(k)) < w
_< k.
V. Layoffs
Any feasible contract has the property that if Y(w ) = u(w ) , then
Y(w) = u(w) and e(w) = s(w) = 0, for w < w <^ w. This follows since
Y(w+ ) = eu(w) + (l-e)u(w++s) > u(w+ ) and Y(w+ ) = (l-e)u' (w
+
+s)
_<
(l-e)u'(w ) _< u'(w ). Since w < k by assumption, an optimal contract
satisfies Y(w) > u(w ).
The following lemma shows that, with layoffs, all workers with
opportunity wage less than k are fully employed. In fact, workers
whose opportunity wage is near to but above k are also fully employed.
BE
Lemma 1 : Let U(k) > U . Then there exists e > such that, in the
optimal contract, e(w ) = 1 for w £ k + e. Furthermore, X < for
w < k + e .
-19-
Proof : We begin by noting that e(w) = 1. To see this let h(s) =
r , i u(w) - u(w +s) , . , . . . . , +lk-w+sj + —s—*
—
T7—
e
. h is convex and is minimized at s = w - w .
u'(w)
h(w-w ) = k-w . When w < k, h is postive. As long as e > and
w > w , u =
,
/
'
N * In this case (31) requires that e = 1 if
' u (w) ^
h(s)f(w |k) - X u'(w +s) > 0. This inequality clearly holds when
w < k and X ^ 0. In particular, the inequality holds at w since
X (w) = 0, by (34). Since X is continuous as long as Y(w ) > u(w ),
the inequality must hold over some interval bounded below by w.
On an interval where e = 1, Y = and consequently w = 0. Substi-
1
tuting (32) into (30) yields X (w) = [ ,,, rr - X ]f(w|k). Further-y— u'(w(w)) u —
'
more, if w(w ) = w(w) > w then X (w ) =
' W
' X (w). It follows
y f(w|k) y ~
that if X (w) < 0, then e(w ) = 1 and w(w ) = w(w) for w < min[k,w(w)]
By the first paragraph of this section, X (w)
_< implies k < w( w)
,
since U(k) > UBE .
We proceed to show that X (w) > is not possible when U(k) > IT .
Suppose on the contrary that X (w) > 0. If X > and < e < 1, then
w > w + s, by (32) and (33). Hence w
_> w(w) when X > and e > 0,
since Y is nondecreasing. In this case —tt—r > —ft—7—rr» Hence&
u'(w) — u'(w(w))
X„(w+ ) > X„(w) ^y v — T-' f(w
' > 0. If e = and s > 0, (30) and (33) yield:k)
X u*(w++s) +X u"(w++s) = [l-X
u
u'(w++s)]f(w+ |k).
Since w +s >^ w(w) the right hand side of the above equality is posi-
tive if X (w) > 0. Hence, as long as X > 0, X > in this case.y - y — y
Consequently X (w ), X (w
+
) > for w
+
> w, when X (w) > and
Y(w+ ) > u(w+ ).
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It follows that when X (w) > then Y(w) = u(w). Otherwise,
X (w) > by the previous paragraph. But this violates the transver-
sality condition (34). Clearly, X ( w) _< when U(k) > u( w)
.
RF — —
~
When IT < U(k)
_< u(w) a different argument is needed to show why
• •
X (w) > is not optimal. Note that if X (w) > 0, then e(w+ ) < 1 for
w near to but less than k. This follows since Y(k) > u(k), so
•
X (w) > implies X (k) > 0. Hence, if e(k) =1 the Lagrangian could
be increased by instead setting e(k) = and s(k) = w(k)-k. In other
words, if X (w) > then some workers with opportunity wage less than
k are separated from the firm. In this case we construct an alternate
contract, where all of these workers are retained, such that the firm
makes greater profits.
Let (ea ,wa ,sa ) denote this alternate contract. Let 6 be such that
_< 6 ^ Y(k)-u(k). Let Y*(k) = Y(k)-5 and implicitly define Y*(w
+
)
for w > k by:
+
w
Y*(w+ ) = Y*(k) +/ (l-ea(w))u'(w+s a(w))dw.
k
If e(w+ ) > 0, let w*(w+ ) = u" 1 (u(w) + t Y
* (w } ~Y(w )] ). If
w*(w ) _> w +s(w ), then let e (w ) = e(w ), w(w ) = w*(w ), and
s
a
( w
+
) = s(w
+
). If w*(w
+
) < w
+
+s(w+ ) but Y*(w
+
) > u(w
+
), then let
e
a(w+ ) = e(w+ ) and wa(w
+
) = w
+
+ s
a(w+ ) = u"1 (Y*(w
+
)). If Y*(w
+
) =
+ a + a + +
u(w ) let e (w ) = and s (w ) =0. With this construction _< Y(w )
+ a + a + a + *,+ + +
- Y*(w ) _< 6 . Furthermore (e (w ) ,w (w ),s (w )) _< (e(w ),w(w ),s(w ))
+ a +
For w < k, let e (w ) = 1 and
-21-
w k
w
a
(w'
r
) = u
A([U(k) - / Y*(w)f(w|k)dw]// f(w|k)dw).
k w
When 6 =0, Y*(k) = Y(k) while u(wa(w+)) =
k k
/ Y(w)f(w|k)dw// f(w|k)dw < Y(k), for w+ < k. When 6 = Y(k)-u(k),
_w w
_
w k
Y*(k) = u(k), while u(wa(w+ )) = [U(k)-/ u(w)f (w|k)dw]/| f(w|k)dw > u(k),
k w
for w < k. It follows that for some intermediate value of 6;
Y*(k) = u(w (w )), for w < k. Let 6* denote this intermediate value.
The alternate contract determined by 6* yields a feasible contract.
When 5=0 the alternate contract is more profitable than the orig-
inal contract. This follows since the contracts coincide, for
w
_> k, while the alternate contract satisfies the conditions of
Theorem 1, for w < k. Furthermore, the profitability of the alter-
nate contract is increasing in 6 , for 6 <_ 6*. This follows by a
straightforward income smoothing argument. Hence, the alternate
contract determined by 6* is more profitable than the original
- BE
contract. It follows that X (w) > is not possible when U(k) > U .
The above argument can be extended to show that e(w ) =1 for
+ 8 +
w < k + e , for some e > 0. It follows that X (w ) < for
y
k < w < k + e , since (31) must hold. But this is not possible if
• • •
X (w) = 0. Hence X (w) < and X (w+ ) < for w
+
< k + e.V —
-
y—
'
y —
To summarize the above, when there are layoffs there is actually
overemployment, measured from the symmetric information solution.
Employment is utilized as an incentive compatible vehicle for income
smoothing.
-22-
We turn to the form of the optimal contract when e(w ) < 1. The
Lagrangian is singular in e and consequently one must be careful about
bang-bang solutions. The next lemma provides sufficient conditions
for there to be a unique vector of controls which maximize the
-f
Lagrangian. Since the Lagrangian must be continuous in w , it follows
that the controls must be continuous in w as long as the conditions
of the lemma are met.
Lemma 2 : If u exhibits nondecreasing absolute risk aversion, Y > u(w )
and X < then there is a unique vector of controls which maximize
y
H
the Hamiltonian given by (28) and satisfy the state control constraint:
Y = eu(w) + (l-e)u(w +s).
Proof : Consider the problem: maximize [k-wjf(w |k) + yu(w). As long
w
_> w
as \i > 0, the objective is strictly concave. Consequently there is a
unique solution which we denote by w(y). w(p) is nondecreasing in \i
and strictly increasing if w(u) > w . Let h(u) = [k-w(u)Jf(w |k) +
yu(w(ij)). Note that h'(u) = u(w(y)), by the envelope theorem. Now
consider the problem: maximize -sf(w |k) + X u'(w +s) + yu(w +s).
s >
y
+
Since nondecreasing absolute risk aversion implies u"'(w +s)
_> 0, the
objective is strictly concave. Consequently there is a unique solu-
tion which we denote by s(u). It follows from the first order condi-
tions and the assumption that X < that w(y) < w +s(u), with strict
inequality when s(y) > 0. s(p) is nondecreasing in \i and strictly
increasing when s(y) > 0. Let g(u ) = -s(u)f(w |k) + X u'(w +s(u)) +
uu(w +s(u)). g'(ii) = u(w +s(p)). Note that g'(u) > h'(u) as long as
-23-
s(u) > 0. From (31), if e(w
+
) = 1 then h(y(u )) 2 g(u(w )). In this
case w(y(w )) = u (Y(w )). It follows that for y < y(w ),
g(y) < h(y), while for y > u(w ), w +s(y) > w(y) > u (Y(u )). Hence
there is a unique vector of controls in this case. If e(w ) = 0, then
+ + + +h(y(w )) _< g(y(w )), again by (31). In this case w +s(y(w ))
u
_1
(Y(w+)). It follows that for y < y(w
+
), w(y) < w
+
+s(y) < u~ (Y(w+)),
while for y > y(u ), h(y) < g(y). There is also a unique vector of
+ +
controls in this case. Finally, if < e(w ) < 1 then h(y(w )) =
g(y(w+)), by (31), and w(y(w
+
)) < u
_1
(Y(w+ )) < w
+
+s(y(w+)). It
follows that for y < y(w ), h(y) > g(y) but w(y) < u (Y(w )), while
for y > y(w+), h(y) < g(y) but u~ (Y(w+)) < w++s((y)). Hence there is
also a unique solution in this case.
When < e < 1, w > w
+
,
and s > 0, (31)-(33) yield
ct;>> - f ( w l k )(35) u " u'(w) '
(36 ) 1 =^[ l_-_L_-]f(w+ |k), and
y
u"(w +s) u'(w++s) u'(w)
(37) k.w+s + fu(w)-u(w
+
+s)]
+
u'(wW
t
_l 1_
}
m
u'(w) u"(w +s) u'(w) u'(w +s)
It follows that the total derivatives of the right hand side of (36)
with respect to w must equal f(w |k)[
—
r?—r- - X 1, from (30) and (35).
It also follows that the total derivative of the left hand side of (37)
with respect to w must equal zero. This yields two nonhomogenous
equations in w and s. The solution to these equations can then be
substituted into (25) to determine e. Below we proceed to sufficient
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conditions for s, e <_ 0, i.e., for the optimal contract to be a mono-
tonic contract.
Differentiating (36) and substituting into (30) yields
(36') A
w
w + A
s
s + A
w+
= fCw+JWtp^y - Xj,
+
where A - J^lt+Sl -£SsL f(w+ |k) ,
u"(w++s) u»(w) 2
A
s
" { + [u"(w
+
+s) 2-u'(w++s)u"'(w++s)]
{
1
- I ])f(w+ |k),
u'(w++s) u"(w++s) 2 u'(w++s) u'(w)
andA+ = A + u'(w
+
+s)
[
1 l__j f(w+ |k).
w s + - +
u"(w +s) u'(w+s) u'(w)
Likewise, differentiating (37) yields
(37') Bw+Bs+B+=0,
w s W
+ 2
. D U"(w) , . s / + M U'(W +S) u"(w)where B = ' [u(w)-u(w +s)J - 7 ,w
u'(w) Z u"(w +s) u'(w) Z
,
Iu"(w +s) 2u'(wVs) - u'(w++s) 2u"'(w +s)]
f
1
_
1 ,
s +2 + '
u'(w +s) u'(w) u'(w +s)
and B + = B - 1.
w s
Note that B f(w Ik) = -A u'(w +s). Also note that w < w + s when
s s
X < 0, from (32) and (33). Hence, when X < and u exhibits non-
y y
-a -b
w wincreasing absolute risk aversion we have: A < 0, ——- < —r— , and&
s A B
-B + s s
> —~- > -1. From this it follows that w < 0, s < if
D —
S
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-A + + f(w
+ |k)[ — z - X ] -B +
w ' u'(w) u , w 9
< —-— . After some manipulation it can
A o
s s
be shown that this inequality is equivalent to:
(38)
u'0As)
[ i L_] f .<W*|k) < [—±- + i Xjf(w+
i
u"(w +s) u'(w +s) u*(w) u'(w) u*(w +s)
When (38) holds e, s < 0. When (38) holds with equality w = and
-1 < s.
Let w^ = sup{w : e(w ) 1 and w(w ) = w(w)}. wA < w since a
full employment contract can be readily shown to be dominated by a
contract with layoffs when \T < U(k). Clearly, ^(w^)
_< since
e £ 1 is required. From (25) it follows that w(wA ) _< 0. Hence, (38)
must hold at w^. Let w* = inf{w : e(w ) = 0} . Since lemma 2 rules
out jumps in the controls at w* it follows that w^ < w*. A sufficient
condition for (38) to hold on [wA ,w*J is that the distribution over
opportunity wages is uniform. To see this note that in this case
the left hand side of (38) is identically zero while the derivative of
the right hand side is positive when the right hand side is near zero.
We are now in a position to describe the form of the optimal
contract with layoffs. This description is given by the next theorem.
Theorem 3 : Suppose U(k) > u and u exhibits nondecreasing absolute
risk aversion. Suppose w^, w* are defined as above and the optimal
contract satisfies (38) for w
_> w^ as well as lim w(w ) > w*.
w+fw*
Then k < w < w* < w. In addition the optimal contract satisfies:
k)
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e(w ) = 1, w(w ) = w(w) for w <_ w^;
w(w ) < w + s(w ), e(w ) and s(w ) < 0, and
w(w ) < for w . < w < w*; and
e(w ) = 0, s(w ) = s(w*) for w > w*.
Proof ; k < w^ by Lemma 1 and w^ < w* by Lemma 2. Let w =
inf{w > w. : X (w ) > 0} . We know from Lemma 1 that X (w.) < 0. WeX y — y *'
show that w > w*.
* + + + *"
Suppose instead that w<^w*. If w(w) >w for wA < w < w, then
w(w ) < as well, since (38) is satisfied. Hence w(w ) <^ w(w^) and
X ( W
+
) = [ 1 X ]f(w
+ |k) < [ i X
u
]f(w+ |k) <
u'(w(w+ )) u'(w(w^))
+
X
y
(wA ) f (w |k) < Q< Sq x (w) < Q ^ which ls a contra(iiction. On the
f(wjk) y
+ + +
other hand, it is not possible that w(w ) = w for wA < w < w, if
+
w <^ w*. To see this note that if w = w* then lim^w(w ) > w by
~ w
+tw
assumption and if w < w* then w(w) = w + s(w) by (32) and (33). In
A A A J. +
the latter case if w(w) = w then Y(w ) = u(w ) and e(w ) = for
+ " * + + +
w > w. But this violate w < w*. Were there w such that w(w ) = w
and w^ < w < w, let w sup{w < w:w(w ) = w }. Clearly w < w.
+ + + =+"'
Furthermore, w(w ) < and w(w ) > w for w < w < w. Since w is con-
*
= = + + +
tinuous on (w^,w) by Lemma 2, w(w) > w. Hence u(w ) > w for wA < w
< w.
Since X (w ) < for w^ < w < w* , a repetition of the above
argumment demonstrates that w(w ) > w and w(w ) <_ for w^ < w < w*.
Since (38) holds s(w ) < as well over this interval.
-27-
Clearly Y(w*) > u(w*). Since X (w*) < 0, it follows that w* < w.
If w* = w, the transversality condition (34) could not be satisfied.
On [w*,w] we must show that e(w ) = 0. To do so we argue that X
y
cannot change signs on [w*,w]. On the contrary, if there were a
w such that X (w ) = and w* < w < T7, then X (w) > for w > w
,
by the proof of Lemma 1. Then by either invoking the transversality
condition (34) or an income smoothing argument, one can show that
the contract is nonoptimal.
Since e > is required, it is necessary that e(w ) _> when
e(w ) = 0. Since X (w ) < and (38) is satisfied for w* < w < w,
e(w ) > is not possible over this interval.
VI. Quits
— BE
From the previous section it is evident that when U(k) < U all
workers with opportunity wage greater than k are fully laid off with
zero severance pay. Let w be implicitly defined by
w w
(39) u(w)/ f(w
+ |k)dw+ + J^u(w+)f(w+ |k)dw+ = U(k)
— BETheorem 4 : Suppose U(k) < U and u exhibits nondecreasing absolute
risk aversion. Suppose in addition that
,*n F(w+ |k) • f(w|k) • u'(w+ ) , . , + • .*(*) —^—' s—L-i <_ 1, for w <_ w,
F(w|k) • f(w+ |k) • u'(w)
while f(w |k) is nonincreasing for w > w. Then the optimal contract
is given by
-28-
e(w ) = 1 and w(w ) = w for w < w,
+ + + *
e(w ) = and s(w ) = for w > w.
Proof : It is not hard to show that k-w+s<_Oif (37) holds and u
exhibits nondecreasing absolute risk, aversion. It follows that for
w < k, then s(w ) = when e(w ) < 1.
If the contract specified in the theorem is optimal then
^ inn % f(w|k) ] , f(w+ |k) , + _ * _ ,._,
X = [1 - (k-w)—-
—
L-
- and \i = '— for w <^ w. From (30)U
u»(w) F(w|k) u'(w)
one then gets X
v
=
F(w+ |k)(k-w)f (w|k)
? for w
+
<; ^ ^ condition (it)
y F(w|k)u»(w)
+
is sufficient for (31) to be satisfied with e = 1, for w <^ w. For
(31) to be satisfied with e = 0, it is necessary that * '— _< X
u»(w+ )
But the left hand side of this last inequality is decreasing for
w < k as long as f(w Ik) is nonincreasing.
When (*) of Theorem 4 is not satisfied or when the value of X
£ (k-w
+)f(w
+ |k) .
,
specified in the proof of Theorem 4 does not satisfy —— \_ X ,
+ .
u'(w+ ) y
for w > w, then the optimal contract will involve an interval where
< e < 1 and w > w . In this case the contract is monotonic if w
_>
over this interval.
VII. Conclusion
The optimal U(k) is still determined by (16), even under asym-
metric information. It follows that X = —t> r for all k. This
u u («q)
implies that the full employment wage, w( w) , is state dependent! It
is lower under layoffs than under quits. The optimal contract not
-29-
only treats workers with different opportunities differently for given
k, but also treats workers with identical opportunities differently
for varied k.
Competitive equilibrium need not be Pareto optimal when the infor-
mation asymmetries described in the paper prevail. The less risky the
distribution over opportunity wages is the "closer" the optimal labor
contract approximates the symmetric information optimum. There is a
tradeoff between better smoothing income ex ante and better employing
workers at their most efficient place of employment ex post. As a
result, it is conceivable that a decrease in worker mobility might
actually improve welfare. This suggests that an equilibrium analysis
in the spirit of this paper would prove fruitful.
-30-
Footnotes
1. This idea is the basis of the original papers on implicit
contracts by Azariadas, Baily, and Gordon. The intertemporal
insurance aspect of the implicit contract has been stressed by
Holmstrom (1983).
2. Asymmetrically, it is assumed that the contract perfectly
binds the firm, e.g. , in the second period the firm never makes
layoffs other than those specified in the contract conditions. In
effect, it is assumed that reputational concerns are sufficiently
strong to deter the firm from breach.
3. In a longer horizon model one could allow for new entrants
into the labor force in the second period. However, there is no
reason for doing so in this paper.
4. This assumption allows me to abstract from all considerations
of firm moral hazard associated with asymmetric information over k.
For a survey of the literature on this problem see Hart (1983).
5. See Harris and Townsend (1980) and Myerson (1979) for a
discussion of the revelation principle.
6. A contract which satisfies (25) may satisfy (24) without
satisfying (26). However, the problem becomes much more complicated
in this case. There is a second order necessary condition associated
with (25). This condition is
-e(w+)u , (w++s(w+ )) + s(w+)(l-e(w+))u"(w++s(w+ )) > 0.
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This condition is found by taking the second derivative of the right
hand side of (24) with respect to w, evaluated at w = w , and
subtracting the result from the total derivative of (25) with respect
to w . One could impose this second order condition as an additional
constraint. (Note that e and s would have to be treated as controls
in this case.) This condition is weaker than requiring monotonic
contracts. But it is not sufficient for (24).
7. Under the alternate contract we have
k
Ett = / f(w |k)dw [k-wa (w)J +
w
w
/ [e
a(k-wa ) + (l-ea)(-sa)]f(w
+ |k)dw+
k
From the way the alternate contract variables are defined
^i = i
;
WdYMw^ f(w+)k) dw+
d5 u'(wa(w)) k d6
w . +,
f
1 dY*(w ) , +, . +
-
J
— f(w |k)dw .
k u»(wa(w+ )) d5
Note that dY*f
W
^ < and that w
a(w) < wa (w+ ) for w
+
> k when 6 < 6*.
do — — —
8. Suppose to the contrary that for every e > 0, e(w ) < 1 for
k < w < k + e . Then an alternate contract can be constructed by
first fully employing all workers whose opportunity wage is less than
k + e at a wage equal to
-32-
u
_1
(/ Y(w
+)f(w+ |k)dw+// f(w+ |k)dw+ )
while keeping the contract unaltered for w
_> k + e . To this new
contract a second alteration can be made via income smoothing, to
restore feasibility, as is done in the text. The final contract can
then be viewed as a function of e , as can the expected profit which
results from the final contract. The effect on expected profit from
an increase in e is twofold. First there is greater employment.
Second there is more income smoothing. For e small the first effect
is negligible since the hired workers have an opportunity wage almost
equal to k. Therefore, the second effect dominates when e is small.
Consequently, the original contract could not have been optimal.
9. This condition is not necessary, i.e., it is possible that
e, s
_< and w > 0.
10. The subsequent argument can be extended to allow for den-
sities which satisfy f'(w+ |k) > and f'(w+ lk) < f"(w
+ |k)
^ Further
f(w+ |k) f'(w+ |k)
generalizations require a different argument.
11. The income smoothing argument is based on the following.
First, Lemma 2 can be extended to allow for X > 0. Though
y
-sf(w |k) + X u'(w +s) + uu(w +s) need not be concave in s in this
case, it can nevertheless be shown that any extremum is a maximum as long
as u exhibits nondecreasing absolute risk aversion. It follows that
the contract is continuous when X > as long as Y(w ) > u(w ). Then
-33-
if e(w ) > and u(w) > w +s(w ), income smoothing can be achieved by
+ a +
raising s over a small interval containing w such that Y (w ) =
Y(w ). The complete argument is quite similar to the one given in the
proof of Lemma 1 and is therefore not repeated.
-34-
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